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The Importance of Inferior Voting Rights
in Dual-Class Firms
Dov Solomon*
Over the past several years, corporate law scholarship has carefully
analyzed the effects of dual-class capital structures, which allocate
superior voting rights to insiders and inferior voting rights to public
shareholders. This Article adds to the literature by focusing on a unique
and novel type of dual-class structure—one in which the public shares
have no voting rights at all. It notes that this structure is fundamentally
different because in the absence of even highly diluted voting rights in
public hands, the firm does not have to abide by certain types of disclosure
rules and corporate governance standards. Nonvoting shareholders are
deprived of these significant components of investor protection.
After carefully identifying the serious consequences of nonvoting
common stock for investor protection, the Article suggests two ways to
address them. First, the Securities and Exchange Commission should act
to protect nonvoting shareholders by requiring the same level of disclosure
when nonvoting stock is issued as is required when voting stock is issued.
Towards implementing this proposal, the Article distinguishes between
the situation of no voting rights and the long-standing federal court
decision asserting that the regulation of voting rights is beyond the
delegated authority of the Commission. Second, stock exchange rules
should impose requirements for listed firms aimed at protecting holders of
nonvoting stock. These rules would grant nonvoting shareholders certain
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disclosure and governance rights they do not otherwise have under federal
or state law. The Article’s proposals directly address the implications of
nonvoting stock for disclosure and corporate governance, and therefore are
preferable to the current incidental reaction of major index providers to
dual-class capital structures.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Snap Inc., Silicon Valley’s social-media star, is a
groundbreaking company that is reinventing the camera.1 In March
2017, it proved its ability to innovate in the financial field as well

1. Snap states on its website that “[w]e believe that reinventing the camera represents
our greatest opportunity to improve the way people live and communicate.” SNAP INC.,
https://www.snap.com/en-US/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2019).
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when it went public with a unique dual-class capital structure.2 In
contrast to other companies that have also issued dual-class shares,
such as Google or Facebook, the public float in Snap’s initial public
offering (IPO) had no voting rights at all. The issuance of nonvoting
common stock has serious implications for corporate governance
and investor protection that go far beyond those of the traditional
dual-class structures.3
A dual-class capital structure creates a gap between voting
rights and cash-flow rights.4 A company founder who wants to
raise capital without relinquishing effective control of the company
can issue different classes of shares with unequal voting rights.
While her shares enjoy superior voting rights, the shares issued to
the public investors grant either inferior voting rights or no voting
rights at all. By issuing two or more classes of shares with unequal
voting rights, the founder can avoid the dilution that an IPO
normally creates and hold on to most of the voting rights in
shareholder meetings, despite her relatively low equity investment.
In this way, she can entrench her control of the company even after
it goes public.
There are two main incentives for going public with a dual-class
capital structure: first, it allows the company’s founder to pursue
her idiosyncratic vision for producing above-market returns;
second, it insulates management from short-term market pressures
and thus promotes long-termism.5 However, the controller of a
2. Steven Davidoff Solomon, In Snap’s I.P.O., Evidence of Bankers’ Strategy, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/01/business/dealbook/in-snaps-ipoevidence-of-bankers-strategy.html.
3. Following Snap’s IPO, Kurt Schacht, the Chairman of the SEC’s Investor Advisory
Committee, referred to the possibility that the issuance of nonvoting common stock will be
the new trend with unicorn companies as a “troubling development from the perspective of
investor protection and corporate governance.” See Therese Poletti, Potential Snap IPO Effect:
More Unicorns to Wall Street, but with Horrible Terms, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 2, 2017),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/potential-snap-ipo-effect-more-unicorns-to-wallstreet-but-with-horrible-terms-2017-03-02.
4. Stock pyramids and cross-ownership structures are alternative ways to create a
gap between voting rights and cash-flow rights. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman
& George G. Triantis, Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms
and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE
OWNERSHIP 295 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000).
5. See, e.g., Letter from Larry Page & Sergey Brin, Cofounders, Google, 2004
Founders’ IPO Letter: “An Owner’s Manual” for Google’s Shareholders,
https://abc.xyz/investor/founders-letters/2004/ipo-letter.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2019)
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dual-class firm has two fundamental characteristics that result in
agency problems: weak ownership incentives and entrenchment.6
The combination of these characteristics produces situations where
a controller might have interests that substantially diverge from
those of public shareholders, and no threat of replacement exists to
prevent her from pursuing these interests. This may lead to a
distortion of various business choices, such as the extraction of
private benefits of control at the expense of other shareholders.
Moreover, since the controller can extract private benefits from
capital that is inside the firm, while she bears only a fraction of the
costs of deploying the capital in the firm rather than using it more
efficiently elsewhere in the economy, her incentives may become
distorted when considering whether the firm should expand,
contract, or remain the same size.
Furthermore, agency problems in dual-class firms are
substantially exacerbated when public shareholders are not entitled
to voting rights. In the absence of even highly diluted voting rights
in public hands, the firm does not have to abide by certain types of
disclosure rules and corporate governance standards. For example,
if a company has registered only nonvoting shares, it is not required
to distribute a proxy or information statement under federal
securities law.7 Moreover, holders of nonvoting stock are unable to
express their voice on a company’s key issues and raise shareholder
proposals under Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.8
On the other hand, so long as shareholders have voting rights, even
inferior ones, they are protected by certain disclosure and
governance requirements for listed firms. From the perspective of
investor protection, therefore, there are significant differences
between issuing nonvoting and low-voting common stock.

[https://perma.cc/5YQK-LMHP] (“We are creating a corporate structure that is designed
for stability over long time horizons. By investing in Google, you are placing an unusual long
term bet on the team, especially Sergey and me, and on our innovative approach.”). For a
detailed discussion of these incentives, see infra Part III.
6. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers, 107 GEO.
L.J. 1453, 1465–66 (2019).
7. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-2 (2018) (requiring the distribution of an information
statement to every shareholder “of the class that is entitled to vote” on a
shareholder meeting).
8. See id. § 240.14a-8 (2018) (requiring a shareholder to hold at least $2,000 in market
value, or one percent, of the company’s “securities entitled to be voted” in order to be eligible
to submit a proposal for inclusion in a proxy statement).
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It should be noted that passive investors, such as index funds,
are forced to invest in nonvoting common shares despite their
effects on investor protection.9 Therefore, major index providers
have recently revised their policies regarding multiclass shares and
moved to exclude the stock of dual-class firms from stock indices.10
The exclusion of the stock of some of the most-innovative
companies, however, would prevent the indices from being as
expansive and diverse as the underlying industries and economies
whose performance they seek to capture. The indices then may no
longer reflect the investable universe of public companies or
represent the wealth-creating power of the U.S. economy. As a
result, the access to the investment marketplace of Main Street
investors, who often own stock in U.S. public companies through
an index, would become limited.
Therefore, the Article suggests two different ways to address
the consequences of nonvoting common stock for disclosure and
corporate governance, which are not limited to the indices’
inclusion policy, but reflect a broader perspective of the issue.
Instead of addressing these consequences incidentally by means of
the index providers, and thus creating a gap between the indices
and the economy, they should be directly addressed through
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulation and stock
exchange rules.
First, the case of nonvoting stock should be distinguished from
the case of low-voting stock, the latter of which was the subject of
the Business Roundtable decision in 1990.11 This long-standing
federal court decision asserted that regulating voting rights, which
traditionally have been the exclusive province of state corporate
law, is beyond the authority of the SEC.12 When public shareholders
have no voting rights at all, however, there are direct negative
9. Index funds buy and hold stock in an underlying index, such as the S&P 500, and
they consequently own certain shares irrespective of their performance and prospects.
10. See FTSE RUSSELL, FTSE RUSSELL VOTING RIGHTS CONSULTATION—NEXT
STEPS 3 (2017), http://www.ftse.com/products/downloads/FTSE_Russell_Voting_Rights_
Consultation_Next_Steps.pdf [hereinafter FTSE RUSSELL PROPOSAL]; S&P Dow Jones Indices
Announces Decision on Multi-Class Shares and Voting Rules, S&P DOW JONES INDICES (July 31,
2017), https://www.spice-indices.com/idpfiles/spice-assets/resources/public/documents
/561162_spdjimulti-classsharesandvotingrulesannouncement7.31.17.pdf?force_
download=true.
11. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
12. Id.
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implications for investor protection, which is indisputably subject
to the SEC’s delegated authority under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.13 Therefore, the SEC can and should act to protect
nonvoting shareholders by requiring the same level of disclosure
when nonvoting stock is issued as is required when voting
stock is issued.
Second, stock exchanges should impose requirements for listed
firms aimed at protecting holders of nonvoting stock. Since the
exchanges have strong incentives to maintain good reputations, the
concern that the competition to attract new listings may put “race
to the bottom” pressure on listing standards is not reasonable.
Indeed, stock exchange rules grant nonvoting shareholders
certain disclosure and governance rights they do not otherwise
have under federal or state law. The New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) rules, for instance, require that any materials sent to voting
shareholders, including proxy material, also be sent to nonvoting
shareholders.14 However, these rules are limited in protecting
nonvoting shareholders.15
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II describes the rise of
dual-class capital structures in general and the issuance of
nonvoting common stock in particular. Part III analyzes the
incentives a company’s founder has to use dual-class shares—to
pursue her idiosyncratic vision and promote long-termism—and
sheds light on their limits in justifying dual-class structures. Part IV
analyzes the agency problems that characterize dual-class
structures, followed by a presentation of empirical evidence for
their costs. Part V focuses on dual-class structures in which the
common shares have no voting rights at all. It reveals the negative
effects of the absence of even highly diluted voting rights on
investor protection. Therefore, Part VI suggests addressing the
serious consequences of nonvoting common stock for disclosure

13. Protecting investors is one of the three key statutory mandates of the SEC. See 15
U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2012).
14. See Voting Rights, NYSE Listed Company Manual § 313.00(B)(2) (2019),
https://nyseguide.srorules.com/listed-company-manual/document?treeNodeId=csh-dafilter!WKUS-TAL-DOCS-PHC-%7B0588BF4A-D3B5-4B91-94EA-BE9F17057DF0%7D-WKUS_TAL_5667%23teid-99 [hereinafter NYSE Listed Company Manual] (“[H]olders of
any listed non-voting common stock must receive all communications, including proxy
material, sent generally to the holders of the voting securities of the listed company.”).
15. See infra Section VI.C.
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and corporate governance through SEC regulation and stock
exchange rules. It also explains the priority of these two proposals
over the alternative of excluding nonvoting stock from market
indices. Finally, Part VII concludes the discussion.
II. THE RISE OF DUAL-CLASS FIRMS
Nonvoting shares are not newcomers. In the early twentieth
century, dual-class capital structures that included nonvoting
shares gained in popularity in the United States.16 However, under
public pressure in response to the listing of nonvoting common
stock by the Dodge Brothers Company, in 1926 the NYSE began to
pay more attention to shareholder voting rights when reviewing
listing applications.17 Finally, the NYSE formally announced a flat
rule against listing nonvoting common stock in 1940.18
In contrast to the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and the
Nasdaq stock exchange (Nasdaq), which permitted dual-class share
structures, the NYSE retained its “one-share, one-vote” listing
standard for almost six decades. Over time, however, companies
have recognized the potential power of dual-class stock schemes as
a defense against hostile takeover bids. An increasing pressure
from these companies and the competition from other U.S.
exchanges led the NYSE to impose a four-year moratorium on this
standard in the mid-1980s.19 Despite a later proposal for the SEC to
relax existing restrictions on listings of dual-class stock,20 the SEC
rejected the NYSE’s proposal in 1988 and instead promulgated Rule
19c-4, which barred national securities exchanges from listing
shares of issuers that nullified, reduced or restricted voting rights
of existing public stockholders.21 In 1990, Rule 19c-4 was challenged
in federal court on the ground that the SEC had exceeded its

16. Douglas C. Ashton, Revisiting Dual-Class Stock, 68 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 863, 891–92
(1994); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19C-4, 69 WASH. U.
L.Q. 565, 568–69 (1991).
17. Bainbridge, supra note 16, at 569; Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder
Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687,
697 (1985).
18. Bainbridge, supra note 16, at 569; Seligman, supra note 17, at 699.
19. Bainbridge, supra note 16, at 577.
20. Id.
21. See Voting Rights Listing Standards; Disenfranchisement Rule, 53 Fed. Reg. 26,376
(July 12, 1988) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c–4 (2018)).
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rulemaking authority under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.22
In the Business Roundtable decision, the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals ultimately struck down the new rule as being a matter
for state corporate law and beyond the SEC’s delegated authority.23
Despite the Business Roundtable decision, the SEC succeeded in
persuading the main stock exchanges to adopt a policy similar to
the former Rule 19c-4 in their listing standards. Although both the
NYSE’s and Nasdaq’s policies generally granted companies wide
latitude in structuring disparate voting rights for multiple classes
of common stock at the time of an IPO, they set limitations on
subsequent actions that reduce or restrict voting rights of existing
public stockholders.24 Therefore, while U.S.-listed companies face
constraints on a dual-class recapitalization, they have been largely
free to go public with a dual-class capital structure.
More than 13.5% of the 133 companies listing shares on U.S.
exchanges in 2015 have set up a dual-class structure, compared
with 12% in 2014, and just 1% in 2005.25 The trend of multiple-share
classes gained steam in 2004 when Google decided to go public
with a dual-class capital structure, granting its cofounders,
executive management team, and directors 61.4% of the voting
power.26 In the years since, the multiclass capital structure has
become the norm in Silicon Valley among many hi-tech
companies.27 It has enabled the founders of companies that have
gone public such as Google, Facebook, Zynga, Groupon, LinkedIn
and Yelp to hold the majority of voting rights and entrench their
control of the company by issuing special classes of shares that give

22. For the statutory mandates of the SEC, see 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2012).
23. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
24. See NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 14, § 313.00(A)–(B); Voting Rules,

Nasdaq Stock Market Listing Rules § 5640 (2019), http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com
/NASDAQTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_1_4_3_8_31&manual=%2Fnas
daq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq-equityrules%2F [hereinafter Nasdaq Listing Rules].
25. Kristin Lin, The Big Number, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 17, 2015, 10:41 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-big-number-1439865699.
26. See Page & Brin, supra note 5.
27. Jeff Green & Ari Levy, Zuckerberg Stock Grip Becomes New Normal in Silicon Valley,
BLOOMBERG (May 6, 2012, 10:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201205-07/zuckerberg-stock-grip-becomes-new-normal-in-silicon-valley-tech.
Lise
Buyer,
principal at Class V Group in Portola Valley, California, stated that “[i]t may be everybody
tries [a dual-class structure], because the market seems to be giving everyone a pass.” Id.
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them more votes than the holders of other classes of shares.28 These
technology companies followed in the footsteps of veteran media
corporations like the New York Times, News Corp., and Viacom,
which had adopted the multiple-class share model for their IPOs.29
The trend of listing dual-class shares on U.S. stock exchanges is
not limited to U.S. companies. Since the United Kingdom and Hong
Kong prohibited the use of dual-class stock,30 some foreign
companies have chosen to list their dual-class shares on U.S.
exchanges. For example, in 2012, Manchester United, the famous
English soccer club, preferred to list its shares on the NYSE rather
than the London Stock Exchange due to the option of using a dualclass capital structure.31 Similarly, in 2014, Alibaba, the Chinese ecommerce giant, went public on the NYSE rather than the Hong
Kong Stock Exchange in order to use a dual-class structure.32
In contrast to IPOs in which the public float had at least some
voting rights, Snap’s IPO in March 2017 appears to be the first
nonvoting listing IPO on a U.S. exchange since the NYSE in 1940
generally barred multiclass common stock structures with unequal
voting rights.33 Following its IPO, Snap has a three-tiered capital
28. James Surowiecki, Unequal Shares, NEW YORKER (May 21, 2012),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/05/28/unequal-shares.
29. It was argued that “insulation from the vagaries of the” capital market could help
protect a news outlet’s editorial independence. See Green & Levy, supra note 27.
30. See H.K. EXCHS. & CLEARING LTD., Concept Paper: Weighted Voting Rights, at 25–28
(Hong Kong), III-12 to III-13 (UK) (Aug. 2014), https://www.hkex.com.hk/-/media/HKEXMarket/News/Market-Consultations/2011-to-2015/August-2014-Weighted-VotingRights/Consultation-paper/cp2014082.pdf. The Hong Kong Stock Exchange has recently
revised its rules regarding dual-class shares. See Benjamin Robertson, Hong Kong Adds DualClass Shares, Paving Way for Tech Titans, BLOOMBERG (April 24, 2018, 4:38 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-24/hong-kong-approves-dual-classshares-paving-way-for-tech-titans.
31. Steven Davidoff Solomon, In Manchester United’s I.P.O., a Preference for American
Rules, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (July 10, 2012, 2:32 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012
/07/10/in-manchester-uniteds-i-p-o-a-preference-for-u-s-rules.
32. See Shen Wei & Angus Young, Dual Share Plan in Context: Making Sense of Hong
Kong’s Decision Not to Embrace Alibaba’s Listing, 26 INT’L COMPANY & COM. L. REV. 4 (2015).
33. Indeed, since their dual-class IPOs, Google and Under Armour also listed
nonvoting shares that were issued to existing public shareholders in a stock split, while
Facebook attempted to do the same but gave up the midstream issuance of nonvoting shares
following shareholder litigation. Yet, public shareholders of Google and Under Armour, in
contrast to Snap, received at the IPOs at least some voting rights. See Google Inc., Definitive
Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 56–87 (May 9, 2012); Under Armour Inc., Definitive Proxy
Statement (Form DEF 14A) 5–35 (July 13, 2015); Facebook, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K)
(Sep. 21, 2017); see also Steven Davidoff Solomon, Snap’s Plan Is Most Unfriendly

541

004.SOLOMON_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2/14/20 1:54 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2019

structure. The founders, Evan Spiegel and Bobby Murphy, hold
Class C shares and are entitled to ten votes per share on matters
submitted to Snap’s shareholders for approval. Pre-IPO VC
investors and other insiders hold Class B shares and are entitled to
one vote per share. Public investors hold Class A shares and are
entitled to no vote. Following the IPO, the founders can exercise
voting rights with respect to their Class C common stock, which
represents approximately 88.5% of the voting power of Snap’s
outstanding capital stock.34
Snap’s unique dual-class capital structure with its nonvoting
common stock has serious implications for investor protection that
need to be understood and addressed. To achieve these goals, the
next two Parts of the Article will discuss and analyze the pros and
cons of dual-class structures in general and then the following Parts
will discuss dual-class structures in which the common shares have
no voting rights at all.
III. INCENTIVES FOR DUAL-CLASS STRUCTURES
Founders articulate two main reasons for going public with a
dual-class structure. The first is that it enables them to pursue their
idiosyncratic vision for the company. The second is that it insulates
management from short-term market pressures, allowing
management to make decisions that enhance long-term value.35
This Part analyzes these incentives and sheds light on their limits
in justifying dual-class structures.
A. The Founder’s Idiosyncratic Vision
A dual-class structure enables a company’s founder to hold the
majority of voting rights and entrench her control of the company
even after it goes public. It is argued that uncontestable and
indefinite control allows a talented founder to implement her

to Outsiders, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/business/
dealbook/snap-ipo-plan-evan-spiegel.html.
34. Snap Inc., Registration Statement (Amendment No. 3 to Form S-1/A) 4 (Feb. 24,
2017) [hereinafter Snap Prospectus].
35. See, e.g., Page & Brin, supra note 5.
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idiosyncratic vision,36 which may produce above-market returns,
benefiting not only the founder but also the investors.37 Therefore,
the allocation of superior voting rights to the founder and inferior
voting rights, or even no voting rights at all, to the investors is
value-enhancing and thus justified.
This argument assumes that (a) founders have superior
business skills and knowledge relative to other shareholders, and
(b) they utilize their superior skills and knowledge to benefit all
shareholders. However, neither of these assumptions is always or
necessarily correct.
Given the specific risk of investing in a single company,
shareholders often diversify their capital market investments.38 A
byproduct of their investments across many corporations is that
they accumulate professional knowledge and enhance their
expertise. Shareholder meetings in different corporations often deal
with similar issues, such as corporate governance and executive
compensation. Thus, shareholders—particularly institutional
investors—acquire knowledge, experience, and expertise through
their investments in many corporations.39 Therefore, at least with
regard to matters that are frequently debated at shareholder
meetings, founders do not necessarily wield superior knowledge or
expertise as compared to other shareholders.40
Even if we were to accept the assumption that founders of dualclass firms have superior business skills and knowledge, there is no
guarantee that these advantages will be applied in a way that will
maximize the aggregate shareholder wealth. Quite the contrary: a
founder might exploit her advantages to advance courses of action
that serve her private interests but conflict with the interests of
public investors. For example, she might extract private benefits of

36. Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125
YALE L.J. 560, 565 (2016) (“[C]ontrol allows entrepreneurs to pursue business strategies that
they believe will produce above-market returns by securing the ability to implement their
vision in the manner they see fit.”).
37. Id. at 590.
38. See RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 196–98 (10th
ed. 2011).
39. Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice,
39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 852–53 (1992).
40. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV.
833, 881 (2005).
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control at the expense of other shareholders.41 Since we cannot
assume that a founder necessarily utilizes her superior skills and
knowledge to benefit all shareholders, the “founder’s idiosyncratic
vision” argument loses its justification.
B. Long-Termism
Another argument often used to justify dual-class structures is
that they insulate management from short-term market pressures
and thus promote long-termism.42 A commonly held view is that
corporate law should not promote short-termism but should rather
strive to support long-term shareholder value.43 For example, two
prominent judges on the Delaware Supreme Court have expressed
concern about the consequences of investors’ short-termism and
urged managers to promote the long-term interests of investors.44
With a lock on control, dual-class structures promote long-termism.
They protect the founder from the risk of being ousted due to her
short-term performance and thus release her from concern about

41. See infra Section IV.A.
42. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock,

103 VA. L. REV. 585, 611–12 (2017); George W. Dent, Jr., Dual Class Capitalization: A Reply to
Professor Seligman, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 725, 748 (1986). For empirical evidence supporting
this argument, see Bradford D. Jordan, Soohyung Kim & Mark H. Liu, Growth Opportunities,
Short-Term Market Pressure, and Dual-Class Share Structure, 41 J. CORP. FIN. 304 (2016) (finding
that dual-class firms face lower short-term market pressure than single-class firms).
43. Hansmann & Kraakman state decisively that “[t]here is no longer any serious
competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term
shareholder value.” Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001); see also John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate
Cooperation, Relationship Management, and the Trialogical Imperative for Corporate Law, 78 MINN.
L. REV. 1443, 1444 (1994) (“[T]he raison d’être of large publicly held corporations is to
maximize ‘longterm shareholder’ and corporate value.” (footnote omitted)); Michael E.
Porter, Capital Disadvantage: America’s Failing Capital Investment System, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Sept.–Oct. 1992, at 65, 79 (“[L]ong-term shareholder value should be identified as the explicit
corporate goal.”).
44. Jack B. Jacobs, Lecture, “Patient Capital”: Can Delaware Corporate Law Help Revive
It?, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1649–50 (2011); Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate
Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their
Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 10, 17–18 (2010). But see
Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124 YALE L.J. 1554, 1557
(2015) (arguing that managers serving long-term shareholders may well destroy more
economic value than managers serving short-term shareholders; thus, favoring the interests
of long-term shareholders could reduce, rather than increase, the value generated by a firm
over time).
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short-term market pressures.45 Rather, the founder can focus on the
company’s results in the long run and make decisions that enhance
long-term value.46
However, the assumption that investors push managers into
adopting myopic policy aimed at reaping quick profits in the short
term, even if it causes harm to the company in the long run, is not
empirically supported. The biggest investors in the capital markets
that own a vast majority of the shares of public companies are
institutional investors, such as pension funds, insurance companies
and mutual funds.47 They are characterized by a long-term
investment horizon, which allows them to meet their long-term
obligations.48 Empirical studies have shown that institutional
ownership is associated with higher long-term investment.49 Sunil
Wahal and John McConnell surveyed 2500 companies and found a
strong correlation between institutional share ownership and
expenditures for property, plant, equipment, and research and
development (R&D).50 Similarly, Gary Hansen and Charles Hill
analyzed data from 129 companies and found a positive correlation
between institutional ownership and R&D expenditure.51 These
findings refute the premise that investors suffer from myopia.
Instead, what emerges is that institutional investors seek long-term

45. The economic and legal literature discusses critical problems created by short-term
interests of shareholders. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and
Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 267–71 (2012); Justin Fox & Jay W. Lorsch, What Good
Are Shareholders?, HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 2012, https://hbr.org/2012/07/what-goodare-shareholders [https://perma.cc/M6CB-E66Q].
46. See, e.g., Letter from Larry Page & Sergey Brin, Cofounders, Google, 2011
Founders’ Letter (Apr. 2012) https://abc.xyz/investor/founders-letters/2011/ (“In our
experience, success is more likely if you concentrate on the long term. Technology products
often require significant investment over many years to fulfill their potential . . . . We have
protected Google from outside pressures and the temptation to sacrifice future opportunities
to meet short-term demands . . . . We have a structure that prevents outside parties from
taking over or unduly influencing our management decisions.”).
47. For the important role played by institutional investors in the capital markets
around the world, see Dov Solomon, The Voice: The Minority Shareholder’s Perspective, 17 NEV.
L.J. 739, 750–51 (2017).
48. Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 561, 564 (2006).
49. Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism—In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68
BUS. LAW. 977, 993–96 (2013).
50. Sunil Wahal & John J. McConnell, Do Institutional Investors Exacerbate Managerial
Myopia?, 6 J. CORP. FIN. 307, 310 (2000).
51. Gary S. Hansen & Charles W. L. Hill, Are Institutional Investors Myopic? A TimeSeries Study of Four Technology-Driven Industries, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1, 6, 9 (1991).
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economic results from the companies they invest in.52 In light of
these findings, there is no essential need to insulate management
from short-term market pressures.
Furthermore, even if we were to accept that investors push
management into adopting short-term policy, there is no clear
evidence to suggest that dual-class structure is the solution for this
myopia. We cannot assume that dual-class firms focus on the long
term, and thus invest more for the long run. Onur Arugaslan,
Douglas Cook and Robert Kieschnick examined data on U.S. IPOs
from 1980 through 2008 and found that post-IPO dual-class firms
do not invest in R&D more than single-class firms.53 Moreover,
Martijn Cremers, Beni Lauterbach and Anete Pajuste examined a
matched sample of 504 U.S. dual-class firms and 504 U.S. singleclass firms that had an IPO from 1980 to 2015 and documented that
dual-class firms tend to invest in R&D less than single-class firms.54
Therefore, the “long-termism” argument for dual-class structures
also loses its justification.
IV. AGENCY PROBLEMS IN DUAL-CLASS FIRMS
The controller of a dual-class firm has two fundamental
characteristics that result in agency problems: weak ownership
incentives and entrenchment.55 A controller with low equity
holdings bears only a small fraction of the negative effects of her
actions on the firm value while capturing the full private benefits
of control, and thus her incentives may be distorted.56 The smaller
the controller’s equity stake in the dual-class firm, the greater the
severity of the incentive distortions. At the same time,
entrenchment insulates the controller from the disciplinary force of

52. See Black, supra note 39, at 862–64.
53. Onur Arugaslan, Douglas O. Cook & Robert Kieschnick, On the Decision to Go

Public with Dual Class Stock, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 170, 171 (2010).
54. Martijn Cremers, Beni Lauterbach & Anete Pajuste, The Life-Cycle of Dual Class Firm
Valuation (European Corp. Governance Inst. – Fin., Working Paper No. 550, 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3062895. But see Jordan, Kim & Liu, supra note 42, at 305
(analyzing data from 1994 to 2011 and finding that dual-class firms have higher R&D
intensity than single-class firms).
55. See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 6.
56. Solomon, supra note 47, at 746 (explaining and demonstrating how a disparity
between voting rights and cash-flow rights exacerbates conflicts of interest between
majority and minority shareholders and encourages the controller to act against the public
investors’ interests).
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the market for corporate control that otherwise might limit the
ability of a poorly performing controller—whether due to agency
problems or otherwise—to continue leading the firm.57 Indeed, the
controller of a dual-class firm is able to entrench control while her
incentives may become misaligned with the preferences of public
investors. It should be stressed that it is the combination of weak
ownership incentives and entrenchment, which characterizes dualclass firms, that produces these serious agency problems.
The combination of weak ownership incentives and
entrenchment sets dual-class firms apart from single-class widely
held or controlled firms. With low equity holdings but no
entrenchment, as in widely held firms, the extent to which a singleclass firm can underperform or run in ways departing from the
interests of public investors is limited by the market for corporate
control.58 In a single-class controlled firm, conversely, while an
entrenched controller with high equity holdings cannot be replaced
and thus disciplined by the market for corporate control, she may
be incentivized to maximize the firm’s value by holding a majority
of the cash-flow rights affected by her actions.59 In contrast to these
two types of single-class firms, the absence of both strong financial
incentives and market discipline in dual-class firms produces a
situation where a controller might have interests that substantially
diverge from those of public investors, and no threat of
replacement exists to prevent her from pursuing these interests.
The negative effects of the combination of weak ownership
incentives and entrenchment will be discussed in the next section,
followed by a presentation of empirical evidence for these effects.
A. Extraction of Private Benefits
The aforementioned combination of weak ownership
incentives and entrenchment may lead to a distortion of various
business choices. Because a controller of a dual-class firm takes into
account the effects of her decisions not only on the firm value but
also on her level of private benefits, she may favor choices that
57. For the importance of the market for corporate control as a disciplinary mechanism
for lowering agency costs, see Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control,
73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965).
58. Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 42, at 603.
59. Id.
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increase her private benefits of control even if those choices are not
optimal from the perspective of maximizing the firm value. The
discussion below will illustrate some situations of distorted choices
in which controllers extract private benefits at the expense of
minority shareholders, a practice known as “tunneling.”60
Let us take, for example, a dual-class firm in which the
controlling shareholder holds the majority of voting rights but only
ten percent of the cash-flow rights. For every dollar that the
company produces in profits and distributes as dividends to the
shareholders, the controller will receive only ten cents, while ninety
cents will be divided up amongst the other shareholders. The
controlling shareholder is thus likely to use her control of the
company to pass decisions that will increase her private benefits at
the expense of minority shareholders: for instance, to engage in
inefficient self-dealing transactions between the company and an
entity affiliated with the controller on terms that favor the entity
and thus, in turn, the controller.61 Consider, for example, a
transaction in which the company sells an asset to an entity
controlled by the controller, which results in a loss of one hundred
dollars to the company, but a profit of forty dollars to the buyer
entity. This transaction would be in the interest of the controller
because the controller makes forty dollars profit but bears a loss of
only ten dollars (ten percent of the loss of one hundred dollars to
the company). In fact, because of the controller’s distorted choices,
any private benefit of control larger than ten dollars creates an
incentive to carry out this self-dealing transaction, despite its being
undesirable from the perspective of the company and inefficient for
the overall economy.
A second kind of distorted choice also stems from weak
ownership incentives and entrenchment: usurping an opportunity
that would be more valuable in the hands of the company rather
60. Extraction of private benefits of control is commonly referred to as “tunneling.”
See, e.g., Vladimir Atanasov et al., Law and Tunneling, 37 J. CORP. L. 1, 2 (2011) (using the term
“tunneling” to describe the extraction of wealth from firms by insiders, i.e., managers and
controlling shareholders); Simon Johnson et al., Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22, 22 (2000)
(using the term “tunneling” to describe the transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the
benefit of those who control them).
61. See In re Ezcorp Inc. Consulting Agreement Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 9962-VCL,
2016 WL 301245, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2016) (“As control rights diverge from equity
ownership, the controller has heightened incentives to engage in related-party transactions
and cause the corporation to make other forms of non-pro rata transfers.”).
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than the controller. For example, assume that the company has the
right to an opportunity which will result in a profit of one hundred
dollars to the company but which the controller can take from the
company for the controller’s private benefit, resulting in a profit of
forty dollars to the controller. If the controller takes the
opportunity, she will benefit by forty dollars, but bear only ten
dollars of the foregone benefit to the company (ten percent of one
hundred). Therefore, the controller has an incentive to take this
opportunity, even though it is undesirable from the point of view
of the company as well as inefficient for the overall economy. Here
again, because of distorted choices, any private benefit of
control larger than ten dollars will create an incentive to usurp such
an opportunity.
A third kind of distorted choice involves the appointment or
retention of the controller or her family member as an executive
rather than a better outside candidate. Suppose that choosing an
incompetent family member as an executive, rather than the best
person available outside the family, would result in a private
benefit of control of forty dollars from having the family member
serve, but produce a loss of one hundred dollars to the company.
However, the controller bears a loss of only ten dollars (ten percent
of one hundred dollars) and thus has an incentive to appoint the
family member rather than the better candidate. Moreover, the
controller might choose to retain her family member as an executive
even if the family member underperforms and would be replaced
but for her relationship with the controller. In fact, any private
benefit larger than ten dollars creates an incentive for the
appointment and retention of the controller or her family member
as an executive, even though it is undesirable from the perspective
of the company and inefficient for the overall economy.
The analysis of agency problems and incentive distortions in
dual-class firms has so far proceeded on the assumption that the
firm has a given amount of capital, with the relevant question being
how the firm manages that capital. However, agency problems
also arise when the size of the pie changes. Therefore, the
following discussion points to a different set of distorted choices
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concerning whether the firm should expand, contract, or remain the
same size.62
It should be noted that the considerations of whether to raise
additional capital are separate from the question of whether the
company currently is using its existing capital efficiently. A
company may effectively deploy its existing capital, but may not
have additional opportunities for profitable investments, and
should therefore not expand. Moreover, even if a company has
operated profitably in the past, there is always a question whether,
going forward, it will be able to deploy its existing capital more
efficiently than that capital could be deployed elsewhere in the
economy. If the answer to this question is negative, then the
company should not remain at its current size but contract by
returning capital to its investors.
From the point of view of public investors and of society in
general, it is desirable that a company should raise more capital
only if it can deploy that capital efficiently, which is not always the
case. If the company cannot use the additional capital efficiently,
then it is not desirable for it to expand. However, in the context of
a dual-class firm, a controller has a substantial structural bias in
favor of expanding more than is desirable, as well as a strong
structural incentive to avoid contracting, even when contraction is
desirable. Because the controller can extract private benefits from
capital that is inside the firm while bearing only a fraction of the
costs of deploying the capital in the firm rather than elsewhere in
the economy, her incentives become distorted when considering
whether the firm should expand, contract, or remain the same size.
This section demonstrates a wide range of distorted choices
aimed at increasing private benefits of control at the expense of
minority shareholders. The distortion of various choices results
from the combination of weak ownership incentives and
entrenchment, which characterizes dual-class firms. The next
section will discuss the empirical evidence on the negative effects
of dual-class structures.

62. See generally, Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Corporate Financial Structure
and Managerial Incentives, in THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND UNCERTAINTY 107 (John
J. McCall ed., 1982) (analyzing agency problems of expansion and management’s tendency
to avoid distributing cash or assets to shareholders).
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B. Empirical Evidence
The majority of the empirical findings support the above
analysis of agency problems in dual-class firms. Studies around the
world have shown that the combination of weak ownership
incentives and entrenchment distorts controller incentives,
increases extraction of private benefits of control, and thus
decreases firm value. Some studies have compared the effect of
dual-class shares on firm value to the effect of other mechanisms of
separating cash-flow rights and control rights. For example, Stijn
Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph Fan and Larry Lang studied
1301 companies from eight East Asian economies to examine the
impact of dual-class shares, pyramid structures and cross-holdings
among firms on firm value.63 They found that firm value increases
with the cash-flow rights of the largest shareholder, but decreases
when the voting rights exceed the cash-flow rights.64 Additionally,
the value discount generally increases with the size of the wedge
between voting and cash-flow rights.65 Morten Bennedsen and
Kasper Meisner Nielsen used a sample of 4096 companies from
fourteen European countries, and found that companies with a
separation of cash-flow rights and control rights have lower firm
values and that dual-class shares are associated with a significantly
larger value discount than pyramid structures.66 Belen Villalonga
and Raphael Amit used a sample of 515 companies from the United
States and found that dual-class shares have a negative impact on
firm value, while pyramids have the opposite effect.67
Other studies have focused specifically on dual-class structure
among the mechanisms for separating cash-flow rights and control
rights and have shown its negative effects. Research published by
IRRC and ISS found that dual-class firms have worse economic
results in the long term as compared to companies with a one-

63. Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P. H. Fan & Larry H. P. Lang,
Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings, 57 J. FIN. 2741, 2742–
43 (2002).
64. Id. at 2743–44.
65. Id.
66. Morten Bennedsen & Kasper Meisner Nielsen, Incentive and Entrenchment Effects in
European Ownership, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 2212, 2212–13 (2010).
67. Belen Villalonga & Raphael Amit, How Are U.S. Family Firms Controlled?, 22 REV.
FIN. STUD. 3047, 3049 (2009).
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share-one-vote structure.68 Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii and Andrew
Metrick analyzed a comprehensive list of dual-class firms in the
United States and found evidence that firm value is positively
associated with insiders’ cash-flow rights and negatively associated
with insiders’ voting rights.69 Moreover, they found that the larger
the wedge between the controller’s voting rights and cash-flow
rights, the greater the reduction in the firm value.70 Ronald Masulis,
Cong Wang and Fei Xie used the same sample as Gompers, Ishii
and Metrick and examined how the divergence between insider
voting and cash-flow rights in dual-class firms affects the extraction
of private benefits of control.71 They found “that as this divergence
widens, corporate cash holdings are worth less to outside
shareholders, CEOs receive higher [levels of] compensation,”
insiders are more likely to make shareholder value-destroying
acquisitions, “and capital expenditures contribute less to
shareholder value.”72 These findings support the agency
hypothesis that insiders with excess voting rights over cash-flow
rights are more prone to pursue private benefits at the expense of
outside shareholders. These findings also explain why firm value
decreases as insiders control more voting rights relative to cashflow rights.
Moreover, studies have shown that the unification of dual-class
shares into a single-share class increases firm value. Ingolf
Dittmann and Niels Ulbricht analyzed the decisions of thirty-two
German dual-class firms to consolidate their share structure from
dual to single-class equity between 1990 and 2001.73 They found a
significant positive effect of the announcement of a stock
unification on a firm’s value.74 Scott Smart, Ramabhadran
Thirumalai and Chad Zutter studied thirty-seven dual-class firms

68. INV’R RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CTR. INST. & INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERV.,
CONTROLLED COMPANIES IN THE STANDARD & POOR’S 1500: A TEN YEAR PERFORMANCE AND
RISK REVIEW 8 (2012).
69. Paul A. Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Extreme Governance: An Analysis of
Dual-Class Firms in the United States, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1051, 1054 (2010).
70. Id. at 1084.
71. Ronald W. Masulis, Cong Wang & Fei Xie, Agency Problems at Dual-Class
Companies, 64 J. FIN. 1697, 1700 (2009).
72. Id. at 1698–99.
73. Ingolf Dittmann & Niels Ulbricht, Timing and Wealth Effects of German Dual Class
Stock Unifications, 14 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 163, 164 (2007).
74. Id.

552

004.SOLOMON_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

533

2/14/20 1:54 PM

Importance of Inferior Voting Rights

that unified their share classes during the five years following their
IPOs and found a significantly positive stock price reaction to
unification announcements.75 Beni Lauterbach and Anete Pajuste
studied 121 voluntary dual-class share unifications in Europe from
1996 through 2009 and found that unification significantly
increases firms’ long-term market value.76 These findings suggest
that unifications per se are beneficial to public shareholders, most
probably because of the corporate governance improvements
accompanying them.
However, some empirical studies examining the change from a
single-class to a dual-class structure suggest that such a change
might also have positive effects. Valentin Dimitrov and Prem Jain
studied a sample of 178 firms that changed from a one-share-onevote structure to a dual-class structure between 1979 and 1998, and
found that dual-class recapitalizations are shareholder valueenhancing corporate initiatives.77 Scott Bauguess, Myron Slovin
and Marie Sushka used a sample of 142 firms that changed from a
single-class to a dual-class structure from 1978 through 1998, and
found that performance improves for the firms where insiders sell
a sizeable amount of their economic interests while maintaining
voting control.78
Changes in a firm’s valuation over its lifecycle may explain
some of the mixed results regarding the effects of dual-class
structures. Lucian Bebchuk and Kobi Kastiel argue that dual-class
structures become value-decreasing over time because any
potential benefits of these structures decline after the IPO, while the
associated agency costs increase.79 Indeed, Martijn Cremers, Beni
Lauterbach and Anete Pajuste found that the relative valuation of

75. Scott B. Smart, Ramabhadran S. Thirumalai & Chad J. Zutter, What’s in a Vote? The
Short- and Long-Run Impact of Dual-Class Equity on IPO Firm Values, 45 J. ACCT. & ECON. 94,
112–13 (2008).
76. Beni Lauterbach & Anete Pajuste, The Long-Term Valuation Effects of Voluntary Dual
Class Share Unifications, 31 J. CORP. FIN. 171 (2015).
77. Valentin Dimitrov & Prem C. Jain, Recapitalization of One Class of Common Stock into
Dual-Class: Growth and Long-Run Stock Returns, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 342, 346–47 (2006).
78. Scott W. Bauguess, Myron B. Slovin & Marie E. Sushka, Large Shareholder
Diversification, Corporate Risk Taking, and the Benefits of Changing to Differential Voting Rights,
36 J. BANKING & FIN. 1244, 1244–45 (2012).
79. Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 42 (suggesting that dual-class structures would
sunset after a fixed period of time subsequent to the IPO unless their extension were
approved by shareholders unaffiliated with the controller).
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dual- versus single-class firms depends on the firm’s lifecycle.80
They documented that while at the time of the IPO dual-class firms
tend to have a higher market valuation than their matched singleclass firms, the valuation premium declines over time and becomes
on average negative about six years after the IPO. Hyunseob Kim
and Roni Michaely observed that relative to single-class firms,
dual-class firms experience a ten percent larger decline in valuation
as they mature.81 Moreover, firms that switch from dual- to singleclass structures exhibit a Tobin’s q that is 0.55 higher than average
dual-class firms, with similar characteristics, five years and more
following their IPOs. Finally, Lindsay Baran, Arno Forst and Tony
Via found that multi-class structures correlate with more
innovation and value creation in the five-year period following the
IPO, but from the sixth year onwards a strong deterioration occurs
in the innovation and value-enhancing properties of a dual-class
firm.82 These findings suggest that any potential benefits of dualclass structures decline after the IPO, while the associated agency
costs at the time of the IPO increase over time.
V. NONVOTING V. LOW-VOTING STOCK
There are two ways to structure a dual-class firm: with lowvoting or nonvoting common stock. This Part turns to focusing on
the more unique type of dual-class structure in which the public
shares have no voting rights at all. It notes that this structure is
fundamentally different from the regular dual-class structures
because the absence of even a highly diluted vote means that the
firm does not have to abide by certain types of disclosure rules and
corporate governance standards. Since disclosure and corporate
governance are important to investor protection, from the
investors’ perspective there are significant differences between
issuing nonvoting and low-voting common stock. The next two
sections will discuss these differences.

80. Cremers, Lauterbach & Pajuste, supra note 54.
81. Hyunseob Kim & Roni Michaely, Sticking Around Too Long? Dynamics of the Benefits

of Dual-Class Voting (European Corp. Governance Inst. – Fin., Working Paper No. 590, 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3145209.
82. Lindsay Baran, Arno Forst & M. Tony Via, Dual Class Share Structure and
Innovation (Dec. 21, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3183517.
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A. Disclosure
Corporate disclosure is crucial to the functioning of a market
economy. Disclosure reduces the information asymmetry between
corporate insiders and current and potential investors and
creditors. A rich information environment and low information
asymmetry facilitate the efficient allocation of resources and
contribute to market liquidity and capital market development.
Some of the disclosure requirements of public companies are
linked to registered stock with voting rights. Therefore, issuing
shares with no voting rights at all raises the concern of a decrease
in the level of transparency of public companies. Without
allocating voting rights to its public investors, a dual-class firm
can evade the obligation to issue proxy statements and other
disclosure requirements.
Federal securities law requires public companies to distribute
proxy or information statements prior to soliciting votes from their
shareholders.83 If a company has registered only nonvoting shares,
however, it is not required to distribute a proxy or information
statement.84 Snap, for example, has three classes of common stock:
Class A shares, Class B shares, and Class C shares.85 Since Class A
is the only class of stock registered under Section 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and is nonvoting, Snap acknowledges that it
is not required to file proxy statements under Section 14 of the
Securities Exchange Act unless a vote of the Class A holders is
required by applicable law.86
However, stock exchange rules may require that any proxy
statement sent to voting stockholders also be sent to nonvoting
stockholders. Indeed, the NYSE requires that “holders of any listed
non-voting common stock must receive all communications,
including proxy material, sent generally to the holders of the voting
securities of the listed company.”87 Therefore, Snap has indicated

83. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012) (governing the solicitation of proxies in respect of
registered securities).
84. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-2 (2008) (requiring the distribution of an
information statement to every shareholder “of the class that is entitled to vote” on a
shareholder meeting).
85. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
86. Snap Prospectus, supra note 34, at 5, 40.
87. See NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 14, § 313.00(B)(2).
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in its SEC filings that it intends to afford Class A holders the same
degree of transparency as holders of shares with voting rights. The
company promises in its prospectus that “we will provide holders
of our Class A common stock, at the same time, any information
that we provide generally to the holders of our Class B common
stock and Class C common stock, including proxy statements,
information statements, annual reports, and other information and
reports.”88 However, this promise is limited in some important
respects. First, if the company does not deliver any proxy
statements to the holders of its Class B shares and Class C shares,
then it similarly will not provide any proxy statements to the
holders of its Class A shares.89 Second, because Snap is not required
to file proxy statements under Section 14 of the Securities Exchange
Act, it acknowledges that any proxy statement delivered may not
include all the information under Section 14 that a public company
with voting securities registered under Section 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act would be required to provide to its shareholders.90
Even though Snap is not bound by the proxy filing
requirements of federal law, it is still obligated to comply with the
ongoing periodic and current disclosure requirements of the
Securities Exchange Act. For example, as a public company it must
report certain material corporate events on a current basis by filing
a Form 8-K.91 Although a Form 8-K would include material
information regarding a corporate event, it is less detailed and
more open-ended in terms of content requirements than a proxy
statement. This means that Snap’s disclosure on a Form 8-K may
include significantly less information than would otherwise be
required in a proxy statement of a public company with voting
shares. Similarly, annual reports on Form 10-K and quarterly
reports on Form 10-Q do not include all the information required
under Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act.92 For example, if
Snap takes any action in an extraordinary meeting of stockholders

88.
89.
90.
91.

Snap Prospectus, supra note 34, at 5.
Id. at 5, 40.
Id. at 5–6, 40.
Form 8-K is used for current reports under Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, filed pursuant to Rule 13a-11, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-11 (2016), or Rule
15d-11, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-11 (2016).
92. Form 10-K and Form 10-Q are used for annual and quarterly reports, respectively,
under Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
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where the holders of Class A common stock are not entitled to vote,
it will not be required to file a preliminary proxy statement under
Section 14. Since Form 10-K and Form 10-Q do not include the
information required under Section 14 with respect to
extraordinary meetings of stockholders, holders of Class A
common stock may not receive that information.93 To sum up,
although Snap is obligated to disclose information on a current and
ongoing basis as a public company, Form 8-K, Form 10-K and Form
10-Q do not provide investors with the same level of transparency
and disclosure as proxy statements.
Issuing nonvoting shares further reduces market transparency
due to other disclosure requirements that are linked to shares with
voting rights, such as beneficial ownership reporting rules. When a
person or group of persons acquires beneficial ownership of more
than five percent of a voting class of a company’s equity securities
registered under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act, they are
required to file a Schedule 13D or Schedule 13G with the SEC.94 As
noted under Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act, the term
“equity securities” does not include securities of a class of
nonvoting securities.95 Since Snap’s Class A common stock is the
only class of stock registered under Section 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act and is nonvoting, beneficial owners of more than five
percent of Snap’s common stock are not required to disclose their
ownership on a Schedule 13D or 13G.96 As a result, there is less
transparency in the marketplace regarding the company’s
significant stockholders and their intentions.
Finally, the short-swing profit rule under Section 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act requires a company’s insiders to return
any profit made from the purchase and sale of the company’s stock

93. See Snap Prospectus, supra note 34, at 6, 40.
94. Schedule 13D and Schedule 13G are filed with the SEC under Rule 13d, 17 C.F.R.

§ 240.13d (2010), and are provided to the company that issued the securities and each
exchange where the security is traded.
95. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(i) (2010); see also Gulf United, SEC No-Action Letter, 1979 WL
13078 (Apr. 28, 1979) (“[A]ll non-voting securities have been removed from the definition of
an equity security stated in Rule 13d-1(d) . . . .”).
96. Snap stated in its prospectus that “[b]ecause our Class A common stock is nonvoting, significant holders of our common stock are exempt from the obligation to file reports
under Sections 13(d), 13(g), and 16 of the Exchange Act.” See Snap Prospectus, supra note 34,
at 40.
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if both transactions occur within a six-month period.97 Its purpose
is to prevent insiders, who have greater access to a company’s
material information, from taking advantage of the information to
make short-term profits. To implement this rule, officers, directors,
or significant stockholders—that is, holders of more than ten
percent of a company’s equity securities registered under Section
12—are required to file reports with respect to their purchases and
sales of securities.98 Again, since Snap’s Class A nonvoting common
stock is the only class of stock registered under Section 12,
significant stockholders, other than directors and officers, are
exempt from the short-swing profit rule.99 As a result, stockholders
will be unable to bring derivative claims for disgorgement of profits
for trades by significant stockholders under Section 16(b) unless the
significant stockholders are also directors or officers.
The above examples prove that issuing shares with no voting
rights at all decreases the level of transparency in the capital
markets. Furthermore, because private enforcement depends on
the flow and quality of information provided to investors, less
disclosure makes private enforcement less effective.
B. Corporate Governance
Voting rights are a “foundational component of sound
corporate governance.”100 Therefore, in addition to adversely
affecting disclosure requirements, issuing nonvoting, rather
than low-voting, common stock adversely affects corporate
governance as well. Holders of nonvoting stock are deprived of
important governance mechanisms. These mechanisms will be
discussed below.
First, unlike holders of low-voting stock, holders of nonvoting
stock cannot vote on significant issues at a shareholder meeting.101
For example, they are not allowed to elect directors to the board or

97.
98.
99.
100.

Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 896; 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012).
See 17 C.F.R § 240.16a.
See Snap Prospectus, supra note 34, at 40.
See Kara M. Stein, Comm’r, Remarks at the SEC’s Investor Advisory Committee
Meeting (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/stein-statementinvestor-advisory-committee-meeting-030917.
101. See Steven M. Haas & Charles Brewer, What’s the Deal with Nonvoting Shares? An
Overview of the Legal Differences Between Voting and Nonvoting Stock, INSIGHTS, Oct. 2017, at 8.
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remove them from office.102 Moreover, they cannot approve
extraordinary transactions of the company,103 such as mergers,104
significant asset sales,105 or dissolution.106 Finally, they are not able
to make amendments to the company’s certificate of
incorporation.107 Furthermore, according to the Dodd–Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the majority of
publicly traded companies are required to offer shareholders an
advisory (but nonbinding) vote on executive compensation, known
as a “say-on-pay” vote.108 When shareholders have no voting
rights at all, however, they are denied any opportunity to cast sayon-pay votes.109
Second, holders of nonvoting stock are deprived of certain
notice rights under Delaware corporate law. In contrast to lowvoting shareholders, nonvoting shareholders are not entitled to
receive a written notice of a shareholder meeting in which they are
not entitled to vote,110 unless the meeting is being held to vote on a
merger or consolidation111 or to ratify a defective corporate act.112

102. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(k), 216(3) (2019).
103. However, under Delaware corporate law, holders of nonvoting stock are entitled

to vote on the conversion of a domestic corporation into other entities and the transfer,
domestication, or continuance of domestic corporations. See id. §§ 266(b), 390(b).
104. See, e.g., id. § 251(c).
105. See, e.g., id. § 271(a).
106. See, e.g., id. § 275(b).
107. See, e.g., id. § 242(b)(1). However, holders of a class of nonvoting shares are entitled
to vote as a class on a proposed amendment:
if the amendment would increase or decrease the aggregate number of authorized
shares of such class, increase or decrease the par value of the shares of such class,
or alter or change the powers, preferences, or special rights of the shares of such
class so as to affect them adversely.
Id. § 242(b)(2).
108. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010). Section 951 amended the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 by adding Section 14A (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1).
109. For more examples of significant corporate issues that holders of nonvoting stock
cannot vote on at shareholder meetings, see Haas & Brewer, supra note 101. But see Dorothy
S. Lund, Nonvoting Shares and Efficient Corporate Governance, 71 STAN. L. REV. 687 (2019)
(arguing that some shareholders are weakly motivated voters who do not value voting rights
at a shareholder meeting and thus prefer purchasing discounted nonvoting stock).
110. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 222(b) (2019) (requiring that each shareholder entitled
to vote at the meeting receive written notice of a shareholder meeting).
111. See id. § 251(c).
112. See id. § 204(d). Nonvoting shareholders are also entitled to receive a written notice
if the board of directors ratifies a defective corporate act that does not require shareholder
approval or if shareholders ratify a defective act by written consent. See id. § 204(g).
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Moreover, holders of nonvoting shares are not entitled to receive a
notice that a corporate action has been taken by written consent in
lieu of a shareholder meeting.113
Third, nonvoting shareholders cannot express their voice on a
company’s key issues. In order to be eligible to submit a proposal
for inclusion in a proxy statement, Rule 14a-8 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 requires a shareholder to hold “at least $2,000
in market value, or one percent, of the company’s securities entitled to
be voted on the proposal at the meeting.”114 Holders of nonvoting
common stock, therefore, are unable to raise shareholder proposals
under Rule 14a-8.
Furthermore, the absence of even a highly diluted shareholder
vote raises an interesting question about the implementation of
state corporate law mechanisms for cleansing conflict-of-interest
transactions.115 A recent Delaware case strengthened the power of
minority shareholder voting in going-private mergers.116 In the
M&F Worldwide (MFW) decision,117 the Delaware Supreme Court
held that freeze-out mergers structured with a dual procedure of
shareholder protections,118 which require approval of the majority
of the minority shareholders, should be reviewed under the highly
deferential business judgment standard instead of the highest level
of scrutiny—the entire fairness review.119 In later cases, the
Delaware Court of Chancery extended the application of the
analytical framework articulated in MFW to govern not only goingprivate mergers, but also other forms of controlling transactions.120

113. See id. § 228(e).
114. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b)(1) (2011) (emphasis added).
115. Given the concentrated ownership structure of dual-class firms, the possibility of

conflict-of-interest transactions is more significant than in widely held companies. See James
Moloney et al., Non-Voting Shares and Judicial Scrutiny, INSIGHTS, May 2017, at 10, 12.
116. In a going-private merger, a corporation’s controlling shareholder attempts to buy
the remainder of the corporation’s widely held shares from minority shareholders using the
mechanism of a “statutory merger.” See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(a)–(c) (2019).
117. Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).
118. This dual procedure of shareholder protections is a negotiation of the terms of the
freeze-out merger by a well-functioning special committee of independent directors and
approval of the transaction by a majority of the minority shareholders.
119. Kahn, 88 A.3d at 635, 644.
120. See IRA Trust FBO Bobbie Ahmed v. Crane, C.A. No. 12742-CB (Del. Ch. Dec. 11,
2017); In re Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 11202-VCS
(Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2017); In re Ezcorp Inc. Consulting Agreement Derivative Litig., C.A. No.
9962-VCL, 2016 WL 301245 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2016).
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Therefore, the desire to mitigate the judicial standard of review
provides a strong incentive to get controlling transactions
approved by a fully informed majority-of-the-minority vote.121 It
might seem that the MFW procedure would not be available when
minority shareholders have no voting rights, but that does not seem
to be the case. A controlling shareholder who wished to rely on the
MFW procedure to mitigate the standard of review could condition
the transaction on the approval of a majority of the holders of
(nonvoting) common stock, even if those shareholders were not
generally entitled to vote.
This section shows that holders of nonvoting common stock are
deprived of important governance mechanisms. After identifying
the serious consequences of issuing shares with no voting rights for
disclosure and corporate governance, the next Part will suggest
addressing them through SEC regulation and stock exchange rules.
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A. The Need for Regulatory Intervention
The discussion so far has analyzed the agency costs of dualclass structures and the serious consequences of nonvoting
common stock for disclosure and corporate governance. In light of
this analysis, the important question is whether nonvoting shares
justify regulatory intervention to protect their holders. Some may
argue that to the extent that the negative effects of nonvoting stock
on investors can be assessed in advance, the stock price should
reflect the decline in investor protection and thus would
compensate nonvoting stockholders.122 If investors can freely
choose whether to buy nonvoting shares that are accurately
priced by the market, there is no apparent need for external
regulatory intervention.
However, there are several reasons for questioning this
argument. First, it is doubtful that the IPO markets reflect the high
121. See also the decision in this case at the Delaware Court of Chancery, In re MFW
S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 528 (Del. Ch. 2013).
122. Even if fewer than all investors can assess the effects of nonvoting stock on
investor protection, insofar as a sufficient number of sophisticated investors are able to do
so, the effects will be reflected in stock prices and compensate all of the nonvoting
stockholders. See Daniel R. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class
Common Stock, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 123–25 (1987).
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degree of efficiency that this argument demands.123 Second, not all
investors are able to protect themselves from the negative
implications of nonvoting stock for disclosure and corporate
governance. This argument is especially important given the
substantial share of passive investors in the capital markets.
Passively managed funds have significantly increased their
ownership share of the U.S. stock market in recent years.124
Moreover, a large proportion of all mutual funds and exchangetraded funds (ETFs) are index-tracking funds. Essentially, index
funds buy and hold stock in an underlying index, such as the S&P
500, and consequently own certain shares irrespective of their
performance and prospects. As opposed to actively managed
funds, they are unable to exercise the “Wall Street Walk”125 and to
simply sell their shares if they are dissatisfied. Therefore, passive
investors are forced to invest in nonvoting common shares despite
their effects regarding eroding investor protection.
The Council of Institutional Investors (CII) has approached
major index providers to explore the exclusion of share classes with
no voting rights from core indices.126 Indeed, global index
providers have recently initiated market consultations to determine
whether to revise their policies regarding multiclass shares in
general, nonvoting shares in particular. Following its consultation,
S&P Dow Jones announced that, effective immediately, companies

123. See Robert J. Jackson Jr., Comm’r, Perpetual Dual-Class Stock: The Case Against
Corporate Royalty, Speech at University of California, Berkeley, School of Law
(Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/perpetual-dual-class-stock-caseagainst-corporate-royalty. For the general argument that capital markets do not usually price
each and every corporate provision, see Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties,
in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 55–70 (John W. Pratt & Richard
J. Zeckhauser eds., 1991); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate
Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1410–14 (1989); Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency
Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1411–27 (1985).
124. See Ian R. Appel et al., Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, 121 J. FIN. ECON. 111,
112 (2016) (showing that the share of equity mutual fund assets held in passively managed
funds tripled over the 1998–2014 period to 33.5%, and the share of total U.S. market
capitalization held by passively managed funds quadrupled to more than 8%).
125. See MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 35 (1995) (explaining the “Wall Street Walk”
as the “ability to sell out at any time”); see also Solomon, supra note 47, at 755–56.
126. See Ken Bertsch, Exec. Dir., Council of Institutional Inv’rs, Unequal Voting Rights
in Common Stock, Remarks to the SEC Investor Advisory Committee (Mar. 9, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/bertsch-remarks-iac030917.pdf.
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with multiple share classes would no longer be eligible for
inclusion in the indices comprising the S&P Composite 1500,
including the S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400 and S&P SmallCap 600.127
However, to minimize turnover, the change would not affect
existing S&P Composite 1500 index constituents, who would
be grandfathered.128
According to FTSE Russell, its market consultation indicated
broad support for the imposition of a minimum hurdle for the
percentage of voting rights in public hands.129 Therefore, it
proposed that more than five percent of a company’s voting rights
be required to be held by non-restricted (“free float”) shareholders,
as defined by FTSE Russell, in order to be eligible for inclusion in
all FTSE Russell indices.130 The policy would apply to new index
constituents from the September 2017 quarterly and semiannual
index reviews.131 An indicative analysis performed by FTSE Russell
has shown that thirty-seven current index companies would not
meet the five percent hurdle.132 Under FTSE Russell’s
grandfathering rule, these companies would have five years to
change their capital structure (e.g., increase the voting power of
their free float or reduce the voting power of their high-voting
stock) to avoid expulsion from the index.133
FTSE Russell’s decision not to include in its indices companies
that offer only nonvoting common stock, but to require a minimum
threshold for voting rights, is consistent with the thesis of this

127. See S&P Dow Jones Indices Announces Decision on Multi-Class Shares and Voting Rules,
S&P DOW JONES INDICES (July 31, 2017), https://www.spice-indices.com/idpfiles/spiceassets/resources/public/documents/561162_spdjimulti-classsharesandvotingrulesannoun
cement7.31.17.pdf?force_download=true. S&P Dow Jones also announced that the S&P
Global BMI Indices, S&P Total Market Index, and other S&P and Dow Jones-branded indices
would not be affected by this change. Id.
128. Id. A newly public company spun off from a current S&P Composite 1500 index
constituent would not need to meet the criteria for new additions to the index, and so would
effectively benefit from its parent’s grandfathering. See Joseph A. Hall & Michael Kaplan,
Snap Decision: Leading Index Providers Nix Multi-Class Shares, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 2, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/08/02/
snap-decision-leading-index-providers-nix-multi-class-shares/#more-100537.
129. See FTSE RUSSELL, FTSE RUSSELL VOTING RIGHTS CONSULTATION RESULTS 2 (2017),
http://www.ftse.com/products/downloads/FTSE_Russell_Voting_Rights_Consultation_
Results.pdf.
130. See FTSE RUSSELL PROPOSAL, supra note 10.
131. Id. at 6.
132. See Hall & Kaplan, supra note 128.
133. See FTSE RUSSELL PROPOSAL, supra note 10.
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Article. The above analysis has shown that shareholder low-voting
rights are important to investor protection, even though they are
disproportionately much lower than the high-voting rights of the
insiders. In the absence of even a highly diluted vote in public
hands, the firm does not have to abide by certain types of disclosure
rules and corporate governance standards.134 It seems that the
importance of voting rights has led FTSE Russell to impose a
minimum hurdle for the percentage of voting rights in public
hands. This new policy of index eligibility may
disincentivize companies from offering only nonvoting shares to
the public.135
However, these decisions by the S&P Dow Jones and the FTSE
Russell have far-reaching implications that cannot be ignored. The
exclusion of the stock of some of the most-innovative companies
would prevent the indices from being as expansive and diverse as
the underlying industries and economies whose performance they
seek to capture.136 The indices then may no longer reflect the
investable universe of public companies or represent the
wealth-creating power of the U.S. economy.137 As a result, the
access to the investment marketplace of Main Street investors, who
often own stock in U.S. public companies through an index, would
become limited.138
This Article suggests different ways to address the
consequences of nonvoting common stock for disclosure and

134. See supra Part V.
135. Research has consistently established that inclusion of a company’s stock in a

major index increases (and exclusion decreases) the liquidity and value of that stock. See, e.g.,
Messod D. Beneish & Robert E. Whaley, An Anatomy of the “S&P Game”: The Effects of
Changing the Rules, 51 J. FIN. 1909 (1996); Yen-Cheng Chang, Harrison Hong & Inessa
Liskovich, Regression Discontinuity and the Price Effects of Stock Market Indexing, 28 REV. FIN.
STUD. 212 (2015); Lawrence Harris & Eitan Gurel, Price and Volume Effects Associated with
Changes in the S&P 500 List: New Evidence for the Existence of Price Pressures, 41 J. FIN. 815
(1986); Anthony W. Lynch & Richard R. Mendenhall, New Evidence on Stock Price Effects
Associated with Changes in the S&P 500 Index, 70 J. BUS. 351 (1997); Andrei Shleifer, Do Demand
Curves for Stocks Slope Down?, 41 J. FIN. 579 (1986).
136. See A Potential Solution for Voting Rights and Index Inclusion Issues, BLACKROCK,
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-a-potential-solutionfor-voting-rights-and-index-inclusion-issues-october2017.pdf (last visited Oct.. 11, 2019).
137. See Bernard S. Sharfman, The S&P and FTSE Russell Should Reverse Course on
Dual Class Shares, OXFORD L. FAC.: BUS. L. BLOG (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.law.ox.ac.
uk/business-law-blog/blog/2017/11/sp-and-ftse-russell-should-reverse-course-dualclass-shares.
138. See Jackson, supra note 123.
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corporate governance, which are not limited to the indices’
inclusion policy, but reflect a broader perspective of the issue.
Instead of addressing these consequences incidentally by means of
the index providers and thus creating a gap between the indices
and the economy, the Article suggests addressing them directly
through SEC regulation and stock exchange rules.139 These
proposals will be discussed in the next two sections.
B. SEC Regulation
Protecting investors is one of the three key statutory mandates
of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.140 To achieve this
goal, the SEC set disclosure requirements for public companies
designed to ensure transparency. The SEC’s disclosure regime
relies on fully informed investors to hold boards and management
accountable through the exercise of the shareholder franchise.
The above analysis has shown, however, that issuing public
shares with no voting rights at all has negative effects on investor
protection.141 This is because some of the disclosure requirements
of public companies are linked to public shares with voting rights.
To protect nonvoting shareholders, therefore, the SEC should
revisit the linkage between voting rights and disclosure, requiring
the same level of disclosure for the issuance of both voting and
nonvoting stock.
Some may question the SEC’s authority to regulate shareholder
voting rights, which traditionally have been the exclusive province
of state corporate law. Indeed, in 1990 a federal court discussed this
issue while examining Rule 19c-4 of the SEC.142 This rule barred
national securities exchanges from listing the stock of any issuer
that took any action with “the effect of nullifying, restricting, or
disparately reducing the per share voting rights” of existing
139. See Matt Levine, Listing Standards and Dividend Shares, BLOOMBERG: VIEW (Apr. 13,
2017, 9:25 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-04-13/listing-standardsand-dividend-shares (arguing that excluding companies on the basis of governance
characteristics is a “weird role” for stock indices, as opposed to the “long tradition of
corporate governance standards being imposed by stock exchanges, as ‘listing standards,’ a
sort of seal of approval that listed companies have been screened by the exchange and found
to be plausible investments”).
140. The mission of the SEC is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient
markets, and facilitate capital formation. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2012).
141. See supra Section V.A.
142. See Voting Rights Listing Standards, supra note 21.
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common stock shareholders of the company.143 In its Business
Roundtable decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
struck down the rule as being beyond the SEC’s delegated
authority under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The court
found that “the Exchange Act cannot be understood to include
regulation of an issue that is so far beyond matters of
disclosure . . . and that is concededly a part of corporate
governance traditionally left to the states.”144
It should be noted that the SEC based its authority to adopt Rule
19c-4 on its powers under Section 19(c) of the Securities Exchange
Act,145 which permits it to amend exchange rules provided that the
Commission’s action furthers the purposes of the Act. The D.C.
Circuit determined, however, that the attempt to regulate corporate
voting rights furthered none of the Securities Exchange Act’s
purposes. In striking down Rule 19c-4, the court adopted a narrow
view of the Act’s purposes. According to the court, the primary
purpose of the federal proxy regulation under Section 14 of the
Securities Exchange Act is disclosure.146
However, even under this narrow view of the Securities
Exchange Act, it plainly delegates authority to the SEC to regulate
nonvoting common stock. There is a significant difference between
issuing shares with inferior voting rights—as was in the case of the
Business Roundtable decision—and issuing shares with no voting
rights at all. Issuing nonvoting shares is not just a matter of
allocation of powers among classes of shareholders, which may be
governed by state corporate law. In contrast, it has direct negative
implications for disclosure and investor protection, which are
subject to the SEC’s delegated authority under the Securities
Exchange Act: The Commission has a statutory mandate to protect
investors, and therefore it should act to protect holders of
nonvoting common stock by expanding disclosure requirements.
The linkage between voting rights and disclosure requirements
should be severed in order to ensure the same high degree of
information and transparency when nonvoting stock is issued as is
required when voting stock is issued. For example, since annual
143.
144.
145.
146.

566

Id.
See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (2012).
See Bus. Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 410–11.
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reports on Form 10-K and quarterly reports on Form 10-Q do not
include all the information included in proxy statements and
required under Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
nonvoting shareholders are provided with lower level of
disclosure and transparency than voting shareholders.147 The SEC
should consider adding disclosure requirements to Form 10-K
and Form 10-Q that would provide nonvoting shareholders
with all information equivalent to that ordinarily included in
proxy statements.148
C. Stock Exchange Rules
Important goals of stock exchange rules are to ensure the
quality of the markets and protect investors.149 To fulfill these goals,
stock exchanges promulgate rules for listed firms governing
financial disclosure, annual meetings, or corporate structure. The
exchange rules should impose requirements for listed firms aimed
at protecting holders of nonvoting stock by expanding their
disclosure and governance rights.
A possible challenge to imposing strict requirements for listed
firms is that the competition to attract new listings may put “race
to the bottom” pressure on listing standards. This pressure may
lead stock exchanges to adopt pro-management and antishareholder rules. Since corporate managers decide whether and
where to list, they may base their decision on which exchange
offers them the greatest opportunity to benefit at the expense of
investors. If one exchange relaxes its rules and allows managers to
exploit investors, other exchanges may be forced to follow suit to
avoid losing their listings to the first exchange. The competition
among stock exchanges will result in a “race to the bottom” in

147. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text.
148. See Recommendation of the Investor as Owner Subcommittee: Dual Class and

Other Entrenching Governance Structures in Public Companies, SEC (Feb. 27, 2018) at 7,
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/iac030818-investor-asowner-subcommittee-recommendation.pdf.
149. See, e.g., Nasdaq Listing Rules, supra note 24, § 5101 (“Nasdaq is entrusted with the
authority to preserve and strengthen the quality of and public confidence in its market.”).
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which all exchanges end up with similar lax rules to the detriment
of investors.150
However, stock exchanges have strong incentives to maintain
good reputations.151 The long-run profitability of an exchange is
highly dependent on trading volume, which will fall if investors
doubt its integrity. The listing rules chosen by a particular exchange
are a matter of public record, and thus observable by investors. If
the rules allowed by an exchange were to produce systematic
exploitation of investors, investors would lose confidence in the
exchange, and the exchange would lose trading volume as
investors took their business elsewhere. It is clearly in the interest
of exchanges, therefore, to adopt listing rules that protect investors.
Moreover, maintaining a good reputation is most important when
repeat transactions are contemplated. Repeat business is essential
to the success of a stock exchange, and thus the costs of losing it
through damage to reputation are high. Therefore, the “race to the
bottom” argument loses some of its merit.
The listing standards adopted by the main stock exchanges
following the Business Roundtable decision152 in 1990 may illustrate
the incentives of the exchanges to maintain good reputations in the
present context. Even though the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals overturned Rule 19c-4 of the SEC,153 both the NYSE and
the Nasdaq voluntarily decided to adopt a policy similar to this rule
in their listing standards.154
Indeed, stock exchange rules grant nonvoting shareholders of
listed companies governance rights they do not otherwise have
under state law. For example, under Delaware corporate law no
annual shareholder meeting is required if the directors are elected

150. The “race to the bottom” argument was developed in connection to the
consequences of the competition among states to attract incorporations. See, e.g., Barry D.
Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm, 28 J.L. & ECON.
179 (1985); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L. J. 663 (1974); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory
of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
151. Fischel, supra note 122, at 124.
152. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
153. Id.
154. See NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 14, § 313.00(A) & (B); Nasdaq
Listing Rules, supra note 24, § 5640.
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by unanimous written consent.155 Therefore, companies may be
able to avoid holding annual meetings by issuing nonvoting
common stock to the public and concentrating all of the voting
rights in the hands of insiders, who elect directors by unanimous
written consent. However, stock exchange rules strengthen
nonvoting shareholders’ rights by requiring companies to hold an
annual shareholder meeting even if the only listed shares are
nonvoting common stock.156
Moreover, the NYSE rules also grant nonvoting shareholders of
listed companies certain disclosure rights they do not otherwise
have under federal law. These rules are aimed at ensuring holders
of nonvoting common stock the same degree of transparency as
holders of voting common stock. Therefore, they require that any
materials sent to voting shareholders, including proxy material,
also be sent to nonvoting shareholders.157
Although current stock exchange rules already grant nonvoting
shareholders certain disclosure and governance rights they do not
otherwise have under federal or state law, these rules are limited
and far from addressing all the serious consequences of nonvoting
common stock for investor protection analyzed in Part V. For
example, a company that has registered only nonvoting securities
under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 may evade
the NYSE requirement to send nonvoting shareholders all proxy
statements sent to voting shareholders—it would just not provide
any proxy statements to voting shareholders in the first place.158
Moreover, even if the company voluntarily provides proxy

155. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2019).
156. See NASDAQ, Frequently Asked Questions, No. 82, https://listingcenter.nasdaq.

com/Material_Search.aspx?cid=1,22,45,52,108,71,69&mcd=LQ (last visited Aug. 31, 2019)
(“A company that lists only non-voting common stock on Nasdaq is required to hold an
annual meeting.”); see also Nasdaq Listing Rules, supra note 24, § 5620(a) (“Each Company
listing common stock or voting preferred stock, and their equivalents, shall hold an annual
meeting of Shareholders no later than one year after the end of the Company’s fiscal yearend . . . .”); NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 14, § 302.00 (“Listed companies are
required to hold an annual shareholders’ meeting during each fiscal year.”).
157. See NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 14, § 313.00(B)(2) (“[H]olders of any
listed non-voting common stock must receive all communications, including proxy material,
sent generally to the holders of the voting securities of the listed company.”).
158. When voting securities are not registered under Section 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act, the company is not required to distribute proxy statements under federal
securities law. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012) (governing the solicitation of proxies in respect of
registered securities).
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statements for its shareholders, it may not include all the
information under Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act that a
company with voting securities registered under Section 12 would
be required to provide to its shareholders. Therefore, this Article
calls for expanding disclosure rights of nonvoting shareholders.
Stock exchange rules should impose a broader requirement for
delivering proxy statements to holders of nonvoting shares
registered under Section 12 regardless of sending them to voting
shareholders. In addition, they should require that any proxy
statements sent to nonvoting shareholders include all the
information under Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act that a
company with voting securities registered under Section 12 would
be required to provide to its shareholders.
VII. CONCLUSION
A dual-class capital structure enables founders to entrench their
control of the company even after it goes public. The debate over
the pros and cons of this structure divides continents and legal
systems.159 On the one hand, supporters argue that it allows the
company’s founders to pursue their idiosyncratic vision for
producing above-market returns and insulates management from
short-term market pressures. On the other hand, opponents argue
that the combination of founders’ weak ownership incentives and
entrenchment results in agency problems that may lead to a
distortion of various business choices, such as the extraction of
private benefits of control. The analysis in this Article has shown,
however, that regardless of one’s position on dual-class structures
in general, having at least some voting rights in public hands is
important for investor protection. So long as shareholders have
even inferior voting rights, they are protected by important
disclosure and governance requirements for listed firms.
Nonvoting shareholders, however, are deprived of these significant
components of investor protection. Therefore, it should be plainly
apparent, even to advocates of multiple classes of common stock
with unequal voting rights, that it is necessary to expand the
disclosure and governance rights of nonvoting shareholders.

159. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 42, at 599–601.
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The Article suggests two ways to address the serious
consequences of nonvoting common stock for investor protection.
First, the SEC should act to protect nonvoting shareholders by
requiring the same level of disclosure when nonvoting stock is
issued as is required when voting stock is issued. Second, stock
exchange rules should protect holders of nonvoting stock by
granting them certain disclosure and governance rights they do not
otherwise have under federal or state law. These proposals directly
address the implications of nonvoting stock for disclosure and
corporate governance, and therefore are preferable to the current
incidental reaction of major index providers to Snap’s recent IPO.
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